Capability Gap Brief

Actionable Intelligence

LtCol Susan Murray
Intelligence Integration Division
12 March 2007

INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION DIVISION

IDENTIFIED SHORTFALLS AND GAPS	PRIORITY
Actionable Intelligence	1
Wide Area Persistent Surveillance	2
Database Sharing and Synchronization	3
Signals Intelligence Collection	4
Human Intelligence Operations	5
Data Mining and Dissemination	6
Intelligence Collection in Restricted Terrain	7
Collection in Urban Environment	8
Multi-level Security	9
Foreign Language Translation	10

IID DWG Agenda
(12 Mar – 16 Mar 07)

GAP#	TIME	DATE	BRIEFER	FUNCTION
ADMIN	0830-0930	12 Mar	LtCol Susan Murray Mr. Don Bradley	ITSFAC Orientation DWG Procedural Brief
1	0930-1600	12 Mar	LtCol Susan Murray	Actionable Intelligence
2	0830-1600	13 Mar	LtCol Susan Murray	P-ISR
3	0800-1100	14 Mar	Maj Chris Krajacich	Data Base Sharing and Synchronization
6	1300-1600	14 Mar	Maj Chris Krajacich	Data Mining and Dissemination
9	0830-1600	15 Mar	Capt Brad Hanson	Multi-Level Security
7&8	0800-1600	16 Mar	Maj Jim Disimone	Signals Intelligence Collection
N/A	0830-1600	19 Mar		SPD Development (Core only)

Actionable Intelligence
12 March 2007

TIME		TOPIC
0800-0830	ALCON	Check-in w/ security
0830-0900	LtCol Susan Murray	Welcome aboard / ITSFAC Orientation
0900-0945	Mr. Don Bradley Maj Anthonol Neely	DWG Procedural Brief
0945-1015	LtCol Susan Murray	Actionable Intelligence Introduction
1015-1030	Break	
1030-1145		DWG Briefing Slides and Discussion
1145-1300	Lunch	
1300-1430		DWG Slides and Discussion Con’td
1430-1445	Break	
1445-1500	LtCol Susan Murray	Intro to TRSS-SA Requirements Review
1500-	MCSC	TRSS-SA Brief and Requirements

Actionable Intelligence

JCA: 14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare,
JCA: 9.3.0.0 Conduct Decisive Maneuver,
JCA: 14.2.0.0 Direct Action
JCA: 7.0.0.0 Joint Protection,
JCA: 14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare,
MCT 2.1 Plan and Direct Intelligence Operations,
MCT 2.1.1.5 Support Targeting
Deficiencies in Conditions: Limited ability to rapidly disseminate actionable intelligence and relevant products, to include sensor to shooter NRT data, to the lower tactical levels.

DOTMLPF Implications: D, O, T, M, P

Gap, Excess, or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Shortfall	Limited ability to rapidly disseminate actionable intelligence and relevant products, to include sensor to shooter NRT data, to the lower tactical levels.

Inputs Utilized for Analysis:

- EMW Capabilities List (2005-2019+) dtd 2005
- MCSIR-E ICD dtd JUL 2006 (Draft)
- Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment dtd MAR 2005
- UUNS – Tactical Video Link (UAV-to-Shooter), Persistent EO/IR Full-Motion Video UAV Capability
- MNF-W JUON – Angel Fire
- Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015
- Current Funding Data: POM-08 and Supplemental
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Warfighting Program Evaluation Board POM-10 Guidance (Draft)

Current PORs:

- Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
- Intelligence Analysis System (IAS)
- Intelligence Broadcast Receiver (IBR)
- Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS)
- Trojan Spirit
- Small Unit Remote Scouting System (SURSS)
- Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS)
- Angel Fire (AF)
- Ground Based Observation and Surveillance System (G-BOSS)
- Tactical Concealed Video System (TCVS)
- Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)

Wide Area Persistent Surveillance

JCA: 4.2.0.0 Observation and Collection (All Domains)
MCT 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence
Deficiencies in Conditions: Limited ability to establish and maintain a persistent, multi-sensor collection architecture to enable a covert, "unblinking eye" view within a defined battle space.

Inputs Utilized for Analysis:

- EMW Capabilities List (2005-2019+) dtd 2005
- MCSIR-E ICD dtd JUL 2005 (Draft)
- UUNS – G-BOSS, Persistent EO/IR Full-Motion Video UAV Capability
- MNF-W JUON – Angel Fire, Tier II UAV
- Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015
- Current Funding Data: POM-08 and Supplemental
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
- Warfighting Program Evaluation Board POM-10 Guidance (Draft)

Gap, Excess, or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Shortfall	Limited ability to establish and maintain a persistent, multi-sensor collection architecture to enable a covert, "unblinking eye" view within a defined battle space.

Current PORs

Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP)

CI and HUMINT Equipment Program (CIHEP)

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

Team Portable COMINT System (TPCS)

Small Unit Remote Scouting System (SURSS)

Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS)

MAGTF- Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (M-SIDS)

Angel Fire (AF)

Ground Based Observation and Surveillance System (G-BOSS)

Tactical Concealed Video System (TCVS)

Radio Reconnaissance Equipment Program (RREP)

Human Intelligence Operations

JCA: 4.2.0.0 Observation and Collection (All Domains)
JCA: 14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare
JCA: 9.3.0.0 Conduct Decisive Maneuver
JCA: 14.2.0.0 Direct Action
JCA: 18.4.3.0 Regional Security Initiatives
JCA: 14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare
MCT 2.1.3 Plan and Coordinate for the Collection of Tactical Intelligence

Deficiencies in Conditions: Limited ability to provide CI/HUMINT support across the MAGTF.

Gap, Excess or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Shortfall	Limited ability to provide CI/HUMINT support across the MAGTF.

Inputs Utilized for Analysis:

- EMW Capabilities List (2005-2019+) dtd 2005
- MCSIR-E ICD dtd JUL 2006
- Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment dtd MAR 2005
- Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015
- Current Funding Data: POM-08 and Supplemental
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Warfighting Program Evaluation Board POM-10 Guidance (Draft)

Current PORs

CI and HUMINT Equipment Program (CIHEP)

MAGTF Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (M-SIDS)

Tactical Concealed Video System (TCVS)

Intelligence Analysis System (IAS)

Intelligence Collection in Restricted Terrain

JCA: 4.4.4.0 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
MCT 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence
Deficiencies in Conditions: Limited ability to collect in restricted terrain (urban, subterranean), through camouflage, and in all weather conditions.

Gap, Excess, or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Shortfall	Limited ability to collect in restricted terrain (urban, subterranean), through camouflage, and in all weather conditions.

Inputs Utilized for Analysis:

- EMW Capabilities List (2005-2019+) dtd 2005
- MCSIR-E ICD dtd JUL 2006 (Draft)
- Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment dtd MAR 2005
- I MEF (FWD) UUNS – G-BOSS
- MNF-W JUON – Ground Penetrating Radar System
- Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015
- Current Funding Data: POM-08 and Supplemental
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
- Warfighting Program Evaluation Board POM-10 Guidance (Draft)

Current POR:

Global Communication and Control System – Integrated Imagery and Intelligence (GCCS-I3)

Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Equipment Program

Team Portable COMINT System (TPCS)

Small Unit Remote Scouting System (SURSS)

Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS)

Angel Fire (AF)

Ground Based Observation and Surveillance System (G-BOSS)

Tactical Concealed Video System (TCVS)

Priority 7/10

Collection in Urban Environment

JCA: 14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare
MCT 2.2 Collect Data and Intelligence
Deficiencies in Conditions: Inability to remotely collect inside buildings or through walls on conventional/non-conventional threat force personnel.

Inputs Utilized for Analysis:
- EMW Capabilities List (2005-2019+) dtd 2005
- MCSIR-E ICD dtd JUL 2006 (Draft)
- Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015
- Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment dtd MAR 2005
- Current Funding Data: POM-08 and Supplemental
- Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Database
- Warfighting Program Evaluation Board POM-10 Guidance (Draft)

Gap, Excess, or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Gap	Inability to remotely collect inside buildings or through walls on conventional /non-conventional threat force personnel.

Current PORs

CI and HUMINT Equipment Program (CIHEP)

Team Portable Collection System (TPCS)

Small Unit Remote Scouting System (SURSS)

Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS)

Angel Fire (AF)

Ground Based Observation and Surveillance System (G-BOSS)

Tactical Concealed Video System (TCVS)

MAGTF Secondary Imagery Dissemination System (M-SIDS)

What Is Actionable Intelligence?

- **Actionable Intelligence is specific, relevant, perishable intelligence generated for and/or by the decision maker that helps him/her gain a temporal, psychological, positional, or physical advantage over the enemy.**

- **Timely enhancement of the decision maker's situational awareness accelerates and improves decision-making, precision, and quality of effects.**

- **Success in acquiring and disseminating Actionable Intelligence will be achieved through material and non-material solutions and further integration between intelligence, operations, and force protection.**

Impact on the MAGTF

Explain how the gap was identified and why it is so important to the Marine Corps to mitigate.

- **The MSIR-E ICD (Draft) for Near Term Requirements (2006-2011) identifies across all phases of the Intelligence Cycle the inability or lack in capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate timely information at the tactical levels (below MEF). Additionally, operating forces' lessons learned and developing initiatives illustrate the requirement for adaptive training, structure, TTPs, as well as technical aids.**

Describe how the gap impacts ability to execute our operating concepts

- **The full potential of maneuver warfare, decentralized operations, and expeditionary warfare will not be achieved due to a lack of fully integrated and equally adaptive intelligence capability.**

Is the Gap Related to a required DO capability?

- **Distributed Operations requires increased access to functional support as well as enhanced combat capabilities at the small unit level. The DO philosophy of maximum decentralization of informed decision making also requires the availability of "smarter' technology at the tactical level as well and the institutionalization of best practices.**

Key Attributes Needed to Resolve the Gap

- **Identify the key attributes and associated measures of effectiveness a solution will possess.**
  - **Address the elements of time, distance, effects and obstacles to overcome.**
  - **Actionable Intelligence can be a double- edged sword if not planned for collaboratively and in the context within which the small unit will be operating. Operational requirements for increased precision coupled with sustained high-tempo momentum.**
  - **Access to situational awareness enhancing tools (i.e., multi-int feeds) could overwhelm small units without the proper logistical and institutional foundations (structure, training, supportability)**
  - **Providing maximum: automated data sorting; intuitively searchable data; uncomplicated, disposable sensors; additional training in non-traditional skills (HUMINT-E, intelligence analysis, culture and language) are but a few examples of how to equip the maneuver elements with capabilities within their structure.**

New or Current Capability Issues

- **Was the gap identified because we are establishing a new capability?**
  - The gap was identified due to the exigencies of war. The Marine Corps' operational concepts coupled with the current complexities, operational tempo, and scarcity of resources over a prolonged duration mandated the migration of battlespace awareness assets to the lower echelons.

- **Is there a similar or duplicative capability gap being analyzed?**
  - The capability to move usable information efficiently and quickly to all identified users is a capability sought by all warfighting functions. The purposes to which the information is then used may differ.

- **Is the basic capability MC unique?**
  - Actionable Intelligence is not unique to the Marine Corps. DoD and non DoD government organizations seek the ability to inform their personnel and agents in timely manner allowing for informed decision making while serving away from their HQ in joint and or coalition situations.

Integration Concerns

- **Describe critical linkage(s) to other Integration Divisions.**
  - **Traditionally intelligence-associated assets (UAVs, CI/HUMINT, SI/EW) located at or accessible to the tactical levels, has blurred the distinctions between operations (FMID) and intelligence. The rise in prominence of Force Protection (FPID) activities and assets on the battlefield further complicates the distinctions between roles and responsibilities. With the preponderance of action occurring at the tactical levels, direct control and support of heretofore intelligence assets has gravitated to the operations and force protection entities. The non-availability of those low density, high demand intelligence personnel at the tactical level has created a niche for the cross trained Marine and the slogan, "Every Marine a Collector" is becoming a reality.**
  - **The relationship with the command and control community (C2ID) is a long-standing one. The never ending quest for bandwidth, interoperability, and modularity have cemented the bonds. Moving and integrating increasingly voluminous and multi-source data and imagery has the attention of both the intelligence and communications' communities.**

FNA Results: C2ID (page 1 of 2)

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

JCAP ri	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	C2ID Pri	G/E/ S/N	Gap Mitigation	
						POM-10	Beyond
6	**5.3.0.0 Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness and Understanding**	**5.1.3.2 Provide Positive ID of Friendly Forces in the AO**	**Unable to provide accurate, timely and secure position location information and blue force situational awareness to the lowest reporting unit**	See Note	G:3 S:4	**Yes**	**TBD**
1	**5.5.0.0 Plan Collaboratively**	**Provide distributed groups of decision makers the ability to cooperate in the performance of common command and control activities by means of a collaborative work environment**	**Unable to provide distributed groups of decision makers the ability to cooperate in the performance of common command and control activities by means of a collaborative work environment**	See Note	G:4 S:5	**Yes**	**TBD**
4	**Provide Robust, reliable communications to all nodes, based on the varying requirements of those nodes**	**5.1 Provide and maintain communications**	**Unable to communicate all Command and control data (voice/data/video) across a common IP backbone**	See Note	G:4 S:3	**Yes**	**TBD**

FNA Results: C2ID (page 2 of 2)

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

JCAP ri	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	C2ID Pri	G/E/ S/N	Gap Mitigation	
						POM-10	Beyond
2	**5.6.0.0 Synchronize Execution Across all domains**	**5.3.2 Establish means to command and control**	**Unable to display user-defined operational picture incorporating air and ground tracks (blue, red, white, gray) with minimum latency for effective operational decision making**	See Note	G:1 S:3	**Yes**	**TBD**
1	**5.5.0.0 Plan Collaboratively**	**5.4.2.3 Conduct Information Assurance**	**Unable to protect and provide information assurance when working with coalition, NGO agencies in a collaborative environment**	See Note	G:2 S:1	**Yes**	**TBD**
			Total Gaps:14 Total Shortfalls:16				

NOTE: C2ID has chosen, after due consideration, not to prioritize these roll-up capabilities. To do so might be counter-productive. By their nature these capabilities are greatly interdependent and must be viewed holistically; some of them are enabler of others, other s are inextricably linked. Prioritization could result in these interdependencies being lost and result in a failure to realize the capabilities being pursued.

FNA Force Protection Defense

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

Pri	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	G/E/S/N	Gap Mitigation	
					POM-10	Beyond
1	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to Locate, Identify, and Classify Terrorist and Insurgent activities**	G		X
2	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to Monitor Insurgent Activities along Roads, Intersections, and Choke Points**	G		X
3	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to Monitor Linear/Non-Linear Areas, Borders, Choke Points, Rivers, Pipelines, and Infrastructure**	G		X
4	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to Deter, Detect, Defend Against, and Mitigate the Offensive and Reconnaissance Activities of Terrorist and Insurgent Forces**	G		X
5	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to Disrupt an Insurgency and to Counter the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).**	G		X

FNA Force Protection Defense

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

Pri	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	G/E/S/N	Gap Mitigation	
					POM-10	Beyond
6	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to track RAMs in flight**	G		X
7	**Joint Protection**	**6, 6.1, 6.1.1 , 6.1.1.3, 6.1.1.3.5.2, 6.1.1.4.2, 6.1.1.9.1, 6.1.1.10.3, 6.1.2**	**Inability to engage RAMs in flight**	G		X

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Combat Assessment

JCA: 9.2.0.0 Provide and Employ Joint Fires
MCT: 3.1.6. Assess/Conduct combat assessment
Deficiencies in Conditions: Unable to provide adequate and timely combat assessment without appropriate C2 support structure.
Deficiencies in Standards: Unable to provide 24/7 coverage across the MEF.
Possible DOTMLPF implications: Tier II will require additional personnel, training, and facilities; VMU structure will change with the addition of Tier II and the VUAS in 2015

Inputs utilized for analysis:
- MAGTF FAA dtd Jun 2006
- Tier II and III FAA, FNA, FSA, PIA, ICD
- Various I & II MEF UNS/UUNS

Gap, Excess, or Shortfall

Equipment	Program of Record -TBD
Data Dissemination	CAC2S, Comm/Data Relay
Organic Tactical ISR capability	100% affected by this Gap
Forces supported	MAGTF (ALL), MEF Division, Wing, MLG

Current PORS
Raven B transition (Tier I)
Pioneer to Shadow Transition (Tier III)
Tier II MS B in Jan 07*/ IOC 2010
Tier III new start for IOC of 2015*

*Funds needed in POM 10 for new start program

Possible Solutions
Wide Area Persistent Surveillance (Angel Fire)

System Description:

- **Angel Fire (AF) represents a core component of emerging adaptive P-ISR architecture enabling USMC future operating concepts such as Distributed Operations and Irregular Warfare**
- **It provides broad-area, real-time, geo-registered imagery collection and dissemination.**
- **Angel Fire was designed to fill the P-ISR void at the tactical level, particularly for the general purpose forces.**
- **Angel Fire applications register imagery to the terrain, tile it for storage by geo-location, compress it, and disseminate it to network-linked users.**
- **The networked users have virtual control over the field of view using "Google Earth" like tools. Each user operates independently of all other users.**
- **Users may reverse or fast forward the imagery as well as access stored imagery for forensic analysis.**

Program Milestones

- Nov 2005 - USAF Material Command contacts CG, MCCDC
- Apr-Jun 2006- MOJAVE VIPER Demonstration and User Evaluation- Favorable Results
- Jul-Sep 2006 – Support and Funding Sought
- Oct 2006 – AFRL Designated as Program Manager until completion of one year deployment
- Nov 2006 – JIEDDO Briefs and $19.5M approved ISO one year deployment
- Dec 2006 –MROC approves $15M in OMMC for aircraft and aircraft services applied to FY07 portion of deployment
  - CENTCOM approved MNF-W JUONS

Angel Fire Way Ahead

- Feb 2007 – AFRL awards SAIC Aircraft and Aircraft Services contract
  - Naval Research Lab (NRL) initiates Angel Fire IR Spiral with JIEDDO
- Mar 2007 - Angel Fire Deployment Team to conduct follow-up PDSS with II MEF (FWD)
- Mar-May 2007 – Angel Fire (EO) system builds and aircraft integration
  - Flight tests and pre-deployment training for deploying Marines and Army units as applicable
  - If approved, IR sensors build, integration, test, and train
- Jun 2007 – Angel Fire (EO) arrives in theater
- Jul 2007 – If approved, initial Angel Fire (IR) capability arrives in theater
- Jun 2007 –Jun 2008
  - 90 day increment User Evaluations conducted

Angel Fire

- **DOTMLPF Implications - Unresolved**
  - **Post Operational User Evaluation (FY09)**
    - **AFRL transitions Program Management to USMC (if USAF doesn't step up)**
    - **Doctrine –** Operational User Assessment will solidify most commonly used TTPS, CONOPS (Intel and/or Operations asset)
    - **Organization / Facilities** –
      - Who will the asset belong to? MAW?
      - How will it fit into UAS plan?
        - » Manned platform is the current and interim solution. Objective is long loiter UAV.
    - **Manpower -** Contractor support vs USMC maintenance and logistical support

Possible Solutions

GROUND BASED OPERATIONAL SURVEILLANCE SY

ISO the Marine Corps' P-ISR Strategy, G-BOSS will provide a 24hr day/night persistent surveillance system of systems that integrates C2, COTS and GOTS sensors, and a warning system to detect, locate, identify, track and target threats; specifically activities associated with emplacement of IEDs
-I MEF submitted an UUNS and a JUONS for a commercially available 24 hr persistent surveillance system to satisfy the required ground based operational surveillance capability gap. A SON directed MCSC to begin immediate market research. Solution consists of the Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) III Star Safire tower/camera system currently being utilized by the USA C-RAM program effort.

Possible Solutions
HUMINT Enterprise

A Non-Material Solution to mitigate the 0211 MOS shortfall.
POCs: Maj Tom Meaney/IID, LtCol Jim Parker/HQMC (I), Maj Egerer/TECOM

Every Marine a Collector: Tactical Questioner (TQ) – Skills gained thru NMITC MTTs, MarineNet Curriculum, Video

Three COAs to Train Marines Beyond TQ:

Tactical Debriefer – Identified General Military Intelligence and Core Capabilities, NMITC 'train the trainer" course

Interrogator+Tactical Debriefer – **MSO Specialist** - Issue with use of term "Interrogator and designating Marines as Interrogation trained? Effect in terms of JMDs/joint billets

Perhaps designate as Low level Information Collector (TIC)

Possible Solutions
Intelligence Capability Enhancement

INTELLIGENCE CELLS

" OIF Infantry Battalions Operation METRO"

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned Quick Look Report dtd 4 January 2007

Key Points:

2/7 – Cross trained 34 03XX, information gathering skills, "troop to tack Intelligence duties and established intelligence cells at the companies

1/7 - Introduces OP METRO during PTP, extensively used sensors, census taking (ID and track military aged males), and established 1,400 member Iraqi Police force (IP) which developed into HUMINT resource.

1/6 – Used WASP micro-UAV for company level ISR used Mirage counter-sniper optics of real time targeting, used ground sensors and remote controlled TCVS cameras for surveillance and targeting

1/24 – augmented Bn S-2 w/ 4 03XX Marines and added 6 Marine to each company intelligence cell for 34 total Marines dedicated to intelligence production. Also used TCVS

Recommendation
INTELLIGENCE CELLS

Recommendation:

- **Evaluate the concept of providing civilian law enforcement anti-gang expertise for OIF units during PTP, and embedding law enforcement SME during training and in theater**
- **Encourage early troop to task organizing of battalion S-2 section with company intelligence cells during Block II of PTP**
- **Evaluate feasibility of procuring and fielding the non-T/E items identified as required by 2/7**
  - **Toughbooks or equivalent w/ Analyst Notebook or current theater standard link analysis toolset –patrol debriefs, data collection, info processing**
  - **Toughbooks w/MSIDS software and ability to transmit classified real time images –scout sniper and counter sniper ops**
  - **Additional printers to include color printers**
  - **Video cameras to record SSE**
  - **MP3 voice recorders for squad leaders on patrol**
- **Develop baseline equipment set for operations in which OP METRO tactics re applicable**

Possible Solutions
Unattended Ground Sensors

- **Tactical Remote Sensor System –Seismic Acoustic (TRSS-SA)**
  - **MCSC present TRSS-SA, validate requirement**
- **Small Unit Sensor System (SUSS)**
- **Suggest Separate IPT/WG to Discuss Future Generations of UGS**
  - **Urban Collection Requirements**
  - **Restrictive Terrain**
    - **Tunnels, foliage, rock, water etc**

Possible DOTMLPF Impacts

- **Doctrine.**
  - **What published doctrine addresses the capability? Is the published doctrine current?**
  - **What doctrinal changes result from new/enhanced capabilities being introduced to mitigate this gap?**

- **Organization**
  - **Assumptions: organizational change issues limited to adjustments within existing force structure.**
  - **What organizational changes, if any, will eliminate or mitigate the capability gap?**

DOTMLPF Impacts

- **Training**
  - **How could training be modified or provided to mitigate or eliminate the gap?**
  - **What training requirements are identified for the fielding of new equipment?**
  - **Who can provide the required training?**
    - **When?**
    - **Where?**

DOTMLPF Impacts

- **Leadership and Education**
  - **Can leadership decisions mitigate gap? If yes explain.**
  - **Can leadership experience/change is required to meet or mitigate gap? If yes explain.**
  - **Is organizational leadership is needed to support change? If yes explain.**

- **Personnel**
  - **Describe personnel changes which can be done to eliminate gap?**
  - **Can MOS realignment mitigate the gap?**

- **Facilities**
  - **Describe facility (include MILCON) changes required fully or partially to close the gap?**
  - **Are there theater facilities required?**

DOTMLPF Impacts

- **Materiel**
  - **Are there current materiel solutions available to mitigate the capability gap?**
    - **If “yes”, describe the recommended solution.**
    - **If “no”, description materiel solution that will provide the needed capability.**
  - **Are there any current service/joint solutions available which meets the requested capability? If yes explain.**
    - **Is MC participating in another service’s program?**
    - **Is the MC developing a solution that is independent of other services?**
  - **If new start describe recommended solutions.**
    - **Is technology available/unavailable?**
  - **If recommended solution is a material solution describe DOTMLPF implications.**

WRAP UP

- **Did we address all the aspects of Actionable Intelligence**
  - **Material/Technical Solutions**
  - **The “Man in the Loop” dimension**
  - **Developing Concepts, TTPs and Initiatives**
  - **TRSS-SA**
    - **Has the original intent of the TRSS program evolved with the potential addition of the TRSS-SA in order to meet current warfighter requirements?**
  - **UGS**
    - **Do we have enough insight to proceed on identifying requirements for development of the next generation of UGS?**

- **BACK UP SLIDES**

Intelligence Integration Division
Prioritized Gap Listing 1-4

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

Gap #	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	G/E/ S/N
1	**4.5.2.0 Intelligence Architecture Development** **7.0.0.0 Joint Protection** **9.3.0.0 Conduct Decisive Maneuver** **14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare** **14.2.0.0 Direct Action** **14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare**	**2.1 Plan and direct Intelligence Operations** **2.1.1.5 Support targeting**	**Limited ability to rapidly disseminate actionable intelligence and relevant products, to include sensor to shooter Near Real Time (NRT) data to the lower tactical levels (BN and below).**	S
2	**4.2.0.0 Observation and Collection (All Domains)**	**2.2 Collect data and intelligence**	**Limited ability to establish and maintain a persistent, multi-sensor collection architecture to enable a covert, "unblinking eye" view within a defined battlespace.**	S
3	**5.3.1.0 Access and Share Intelligence Information and Forecasts**	**2.1 Plan and direct intelligence operations** **2.4 Produce Intelligence**	**Limited ISR data visibility and accessibility and database synchronization between USMC units/ organizations, other Services, Theater elements, coalition partners and government/non-government organizations external to the DoD.**	S
4	**14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare**	**2.2 Collect data and intelligence**	**Limited ability to collect on rapidly changing threat signals of interest – refer to the following Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS)** **http://www.itsfac.mcia.ic.gov/MCISR-E**	S

Intelligence Integration Division
Prioritized Gap Listing 5-8

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

Gap #	JCA	MCTL	Description of Capability Gap by Task	G/E/ S/N
5	**4.2.0.0 Observation and Collection (All Domains)** **7.0.0.0 Joint Protection** **9.3.0.0 Conduct Decisive Maneuver** **14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare** **14.2.0.0 Direct Action** **14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare** **18.4.3.0 Regional Security Initiatives**	**2.1.3 Plan and Coordinate for the collection of Tactical Intelligence** **2.1.3.3 Conduct human intelligence activities**	**Limited ability to provide CI/HUMINT support across the MAGTF.**	S
6	**4.5.2.0 Intelligence Architecture Development**	**2.3 Process and exploit collected information/ intelligence** **2.4 Produce Intelligence**	**Limited ability to efficiently identify and display in a usable format, key data within the volume of collected data requiring processing and exploitation.**	S
7	**4.4.4.0 Intelligence Preparation of the Environment** **8.0.0.0 Joint Logistics**	**2.2 Collect data and intelligence**	**Limited ability to collect in restricted (urban, subterranean), terrain through camouflage, and in all weather conditions.**	S
8	**14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare**	**2.2 Collect data and intelligence**	**Inability to remotely collect inside buildings or through walls on convention/ non-conventional threat force personnel.**	G

Intelligence Integration Division
Prioritized Gap Listing 9-10

G – Gap, E – Excess, S – Shortfall, N - NA

Gap #	JCA	MCTL/***IID Section***	Description of Capability Gap by Task	G/E/ S/N
9	**4.4.2.0 Dissemination and Integration** **4.5.2.0 Intelligence Architecture Development**	**2.5 Disseminate and integrate intelligence**	**Inability to provide tailored, Multi-Level Security (MLS) products.**	G
10	**4.4.4.0 Intelligence Preparation of the Environment** **5.3.0.0 Develop and Maintain Shared Situational Awareness** **14.0.0.0 Joint Special Operations and Irregular Warfare** **14.4.0.0 Unconventional Warfare** **18.4.3.0 Regional Security Initiatives** **19.2.0.0 Humanitarian Assistance**	**2.4 Produce Intelligence** **2.4.2 Interpret information**	**Limited foreign language capability.**	S